ATTACHMENT C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

PROMEGA CORPORATION,

Plaintiff,

and

MAX-PLANCK-GESELLSCHAFT zur FORDERUNG der WISSENSCHAFTEN E.V.,

Involuntary Plaintiff,

-vs-

Case No. 10-CV-281-BBC

LIFE TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION, Madison, Wisconsin INVITROGEN IP HOLDINGS INC. February 6, 2012 and APPLIED BIOSYSTEMS, LLC, 3:00 p.m.

Defendants.

STENOGRAPHIC TRANSCRIPT OF FIRST DAY OF JURY TRIAL

AFTERNOON SESSION
HELD BEFORE DISTRICT JUDGE BARBARA B. CRABB, and a jury,

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiff: Troupis Law Office, LLC

BY: ATTORNEYS JAMES TROUPIS, STEWART KARGE and PETER CARROLL 8500 Greenway Blvd., Ste. 200 Middleton, Wisconsin 53562

Also present: William Linton, CEO of Promega

Craig Christenson, General Counsel

Lynette Swenson RMR, CRR, CBC
Federal Court Reporter
U.S. District Court 120 N. Henry St., Rm. 520
Madison, WI 53703 (608) 255-3821

For the Defendants: Parsons Behle & Latimer

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BY: ATTORNEYS FRANCIS WIKSTROM

and KRISTINE JOHNSON

201 South Main Street, Ste. 1800

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Axley Brynelson

BY: ATTORNEYS MICHAEL MODL 2 East Mifflin Street, Ste. 200

Madison, Wisconsin 53703

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THE CLERK: This Honorable Court is again in session. Please be seated and come to order.

THE COURT: I'm ready to make some rulings, but if you have anything you want to tell me before we get started, I'll hear that.

MR. TROUPIS: Yes, Your Honor. We'd like to address two of the matters now pending before the Court if we might. I'd like to address the matter of the clarification of Dr. Beyer; and I know Dr. Carroll, who is here as well, would like to address the question of the forensics, the extent of the original summary judgment ruling.

THE COURT: Well, if it's brief because I've read what -- all that you've written.

MR. TROUPIS: I will be very brief with regard to Dr. Beyer. Because we received their response last

night, and I've been able to read it now, the parties appear to agree that with regard to profitability, process for returning profits, lost profits and like, Dr. Beyer could still testify.

The problems arise because the total sales proof appears -- it has nothing to do with the methodology that the Court addressed, but within each of those reports, there's a series of opinions on the total sales that were involved worldwide. The figure that is in the supplemental report stated on page three at 700 million dollars, the Court's reach of its decision is to all of the kits, we'll introduce testimony simply to the fact that all those kits do, in fact, infringe and that total sales figure is then that number. The problem with us introducing that number based on the Court's ruling is that it's unclear whether Dr. Beyer can testify to that. We approached the other side to stipulate to that number.

The alternative is some rather otherwise unnecessary testimony, I think, from Guido Sandulli that just simply goes through these spreadsheets to come up with a total so that we can answer the first question about the total number of infringing sales based upon the Court's ruling.

The second problem occurs because we don't have any

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idea, having twice asked the question in document discovery for documents on the permitted fields, give us the transaction level database of the permitted fields and the amounts, and in both instances the defendants indicated they don't have those documents; how they intend to go forward proving it. So we're left trying to decide at the very least if they're going to put in some generic evidence of somehow to prove that number that Dr. Beyer would be able to testify, not to a quantum, but at least as to what they introduce that they have included sales to institutions which Dr. Dimond will have testified as institutions would not be using it for the permitted uses. So that he wouldn't be having a damage calculation, but he would indeed be rebutting whatever proof they're apparently going to present to show the permitted uses. So that -- I want to isolate that as to how we saw this going forward.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ WIKSTROM: Your Honor, if I may address the proposed stipulation.

THE COURT: Mr. Wikstrom.

MR. WIKSTROM: I believe it was yesterday they asked us to consider stipulating to a number and I will advise the Court that we are prepared to stipulate to a number. It will be -- and these will be --

THE COURT: Of total sales.

MR. WIKSTROM: Total worldwide sales of the relevant kits. We're trying to confirm the number. It's going to be something in the neighborhood of 700 million, but the problem is we think that there are a few kits that weren't on the list that the Court found to be within the claims of the patents and so we should have that by later today.

MR. TROUPIS: Okay. If we're capable of getting that in that neighborhood, then there's not -- there will not likely be a problem to address that.

MS. JOHNSON: Your Honor, if I may address the remainder of Mr. Troupis's arguments very briefly. It's correct that with respect to profitability and process, we believe that Mr. Wikstrom can testify to those issues as long, of course, as he doesn't intrude on the Court's ruling with respect to methodology.

As for the permitted fields, perhaps I'll have to watch this play out, but I'm a bit at a loss as to what Mr. Troupis is suggesting. If Dr. Dimond is going to provide some rebuttal testimony on permitted institutions or licensed institutions, I'm not sure what Dr. Beyer could add in that regard.

MR. TROUPIS: Dr. Beyer does not -- Dr. Dimond has no access to their customer lists, so he could not isolate, he could not go through them to tell -- to

address those. He can address the institutions as institutions. Dr. Beyer took that information and then applied it to the institutional list that was provided by defendants. It was the protective order that was causing the problem there.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. So it might be helpful if we started with how this case is going to go forward and what I'm -- I really want to know what dispute the jury is going to be called upon to decide. The plaintiff is going to get up and say that these -- as stipulated -- first of all, "as found by the Court, all of these products infringe the patents." Then the plaintiff is going to say "and our worldwide sales have been stipulated to be this 700 million" or whatever it turns out to be. We figure that our lost profits on sales of 700 million dollars would be "X" and our reasonable royalty on those sales would be "Y," and possibly would make an effort to show willfulness at that stage?

MR. TROUPIS: We would likely reverse it slightly. It was our intention to introduce Dr. -- we'd begin our testimony with Mr. Linton, and then Dr. Ballantyne doing a tutorial, and then Dr. Dimond addressing many of the issues that Your Honor just stated. We would then introduce through -- and we would

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introduce at that stage, also through Dr. Dimond, the royalty process; the process and obligations of keeping records; how records are kept; how they're done. It would introduce the license agreement and how that license agreement came to be and what the understandings of the parties were at that time. We would then introduce the willfulness evidence at that point through both direct evidence of a number of witnesses as well as -- that is live witnesses as well as the deposition designations. And during that process, they'll demonstrate a variety of things with regard to the way in which Life Technologies conducted its business, and will address the enormous amount of activity, both sales, support, creation of a special division, things of that nature in direct contra -- in direct infringement of these patents, intentionally, willfully, both through its structures and through its actions.

In that same testimony, there will be testimony about explicit customers and explicit sales that would ultimately go to a potential damage calculation generally, but it will come in at that point simply because they're by designation.

THE COURT: What do you mean by this last -- what exactly are you --

MR. TROUPIS: Well, each of the witnesses is

going to be addressing specific sales of infringing uses to specific institutions around the country and around the world. That's often the context in which Life Technologies willfully infringed the patents, and that will provide that background to the Court and the jury.

THE COURT: So that's what it's relevant to; willfulness?

MR. TROUPIS: Relevant to willfulness, but it has the effect as well of addressing in advance, and in fact there's counter designations which we've included from the defendants, the idea that some of these uses may have been permitted. So in a sense some of that permitted and nonpermitted uses comes in there as well simply because it can't be separated out from that.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. TROUPIS: We would then introduce evidence from the CFO of Promega with regard to exact profitability and meeting the balance of the criteria in order for the computations to be made. It was at that point that we had anticipated potentially using Dr. Beyer as well in that profitability analysis. So that's the way we anticipated our case going in.

THE COURT: And when you say your understandings of the meeting of the license agreement, what are you suggesting?

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MR. TROUPIS: Well, they're not about -- well, it is the -- during the course of the negotiations, the question of permitted and nonpermitted uses was addressed by the parties, not so much to the question of the definition of nonforensic use or forensic use which the Court has already addressed, but in fact there were offers made of these other areas which were declined which goes to the heart of whether or not they subsequently -- we expect that they're going to defend this willfulness by suggesting well, we understood it to mean something else or we thought we could do these activities without violating the patents. And so in anticipation of that, we'll introduce evidence, direct evidence, that in fact they did know; they were told; they did turn these down; they did know what they were doing; and then they subsequently created all of this organizational structure shortly after those meetings in fact, as the evidence will show, in which they just pointblank went ahead and sold into all of these infringing areas. So that evidence helps us understand that sequence of events.

THE COURT: So that's relevant to willfulness you're saying.

MR. TROUPIS: Willfulness, yes.

THE COURT: And Mr. Wikstrom, your plan when

plaintiff rests?

MR. WIKSTROM: Your Honor, we will defend against willfulness, of course. And Your Honor, I want to make it clear that by agreeing to stipulating to what the total sales are, I don't mean to reargue any matter that the Court has already decided, but I want to make it clear for the record that by stipulating to that number we're not agreeing to the approach that is set forth in the special verdicts.

But given the way the Court has ruled, we will stipulate to what the total sales should be without -- it would be our position that they're not -- the 700 million are not infringing sales because we have a license to sell most of those. We will then disprove the willfulness through our witnesses who will testify to the contrary what Mr. Troupis is saying. And then Your Honor, we're going to do the best we can to live with the order of the Court to try to demonstrate the sales that were contemplated under the license, permitted under the license. I understand you've placed the burden on us to do that.

THE COURT: Right. So how long do you think it's going to take now?

MR. TROUPIS: We anticipate our case will be in some time Thursday. We'll finish some time Thursday, I

believe, based on, again, subject to the usual provisos, but I think we'll be done by Thursday.

THE COURT: We won't be able to hold trial on Friday afternoon. I have a meeting I have to go to, but we could bring the jury in at 8:30 and work until 12:30.

MR. WIKSTROM: Your Honor, I have a problem in that regard. We agreed that we would make, I believe, five of our witnesses available live so that they wouldn't have to -- their depositions wouldn't have to be read. I've been asking counsel now for days to tell us when they think they might need those witnesses because they have to be flown in. They've told us about two, but as to the remaining witnesses, this is all news to us that they're now going to be finished on Thursday. I need to know --

THE COURT: Of course you do.

MR. WIKSTROM: -- exactly who they want and when they want us to try to have them there. We'll do our best to accommodate that schedule, but we haven't been given the schedule.

MR. TROUPIS: I apologize, Your Honor. I thought we had indicated the two we anticipated calling, and at this point, I did not anticipate calling the others in our direct case. Is there some --

MR. WIKSTROM: I think there's a

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misunderstanding because in an email exchange that I had
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   with Mr. Karge --
             MR. TROUPIS: I apologize.
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             MR. WIKSTROM: In an email I exchanged with
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   Mr. Karge yesterday, I was under the impression that
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   plaintiffs still wanted us to present the other
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    witnesses. If they don't, that's fine. I just need to
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   know one way or the other.
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             MR. TROUPIS: No, we do not. I apologize if
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   there was a misunderstanding.
             THE COURT: So let me understand, are the two
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    that Mr. Wikstrom knows about now, are those the only
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    two that he needs to produce this week?
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             MR. TROUPIS: That's correct.
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             MR. WIKSTROM: And just may I, Your Honor?
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             THE COURT: Yes.
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             MR. WIKSTROM: Mr. Sandulli and Mr. --
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             MR. TROUPIS: Hall.
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             MR. WIKSTROM: -- Hall?
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             MR. TROUPIS: Those were the two.
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             MR. WIKSTROM: Okay. We're good then.
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             THE COURT: Did you want to say anything about
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   Mr. Beyer then, Mr. Wikstrom?
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             MR. WIKSTROM: Your Honor, Ms. Johnson is
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   addressing the merits on Dr. Beyer.
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THE COURT: Okay.

MS. JOHNSON: Your Honor, our position is, as we set forth in the filing last night, would remain the same. With respect to any intent by Dr. Beyer to offer any testimony on quantum of infringing sales or method for arriving at that, any of the bound methodology that the Court has stricken, we would certainly object to that.

THE COURT: But I think now with the ruling that the burden is on you to show what amount of those sales was not infringing, that really does not become a problem.

MS. JOHNSON: I would agree. Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So Mr. Beyer, Dr. Beyer can talk about what he thinks a reasonable royalty would be; he can talk about the total sales because that will be a stipulated amount; and he can talk about what he thinks lost profits should be. But he cannot estimate what falls outside the license and he doesn't need to.

One of the objections to Dr. Beyer's testimony concerned issues with defendant's data. I mean he certainly can criticize the data that defendants put on, but he can't go -- he can't say that data is absolutely wrong. Here is my data, which is better.

MR. TROUPIS: Oh, I think that that's probably